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Introduction
In the United States, there have been unprecedented changes in family
building processes over the past few decades. Many young adults are
deferring marriage, though they are not opting out of intimate relationships.
The majority of young women (59%) have cohabited with a romantic
partner by their mid-twenties,1 and cohabitation prior to marriage is now
normative.2 Changes in family building are also evident in the sequencing
* Associate Professor, Cornell University, Department of Policy Analysis &
Management; Ph.D., Brown University, Department of Sociology; B.A., Brandeis
University.
** Assistant Professor, University of Central Oklahoma, Department of Sociology
and Substance Abuse Studies; Ph.D., The Ohio State University, Department of Sociology;
B.A., Indiana University.
1. See Robert Schoen, Nancy Landale & Kimberly Daniels, Family Transitions in
Young Adulthood, 44 DEMOGRAPHY 807, 812 (2007) (discussing the family and relationship
experiences of women up to age 24, utilizing the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
Health); see generally Sheela Kennedy & Larry Bumpass, Cohabitation and Children’s
Living Arrangements: New Estimates from the United States, 19 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 1663,
1680–83 (2008) (reviewing changes in estimates of cohabitation utilizing the 1995 and 2002
waves of the National Survey of Family Growth, or NSFG).
2. See Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and the Implications
for Children’s Family Contexts in the United States, 54 POP. STUD. 29, 31–32 (2000)
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of childbearing and marriage. "Unmarried mothers gave birth to 4 out of
every 10 babies born in the United States in 2007"3—though many of these
women are not technically "single." While cohabitation is not yet
universally viewed as an acceptable alternative to marriage for
childrearing,4 nearly half of recent non-marital births were to cohabiting
couples.5
These transformations in family formation processes have taken front
stage in contemporary public policy debates in the United States.6 But
[hereinafter Trends in Cohabitation] (presenting statistics from the 1995 NSFG to show that
as of 1995, half of women in their thirties had cohabited outside of marriage); see also
Kennedy & Bumpass, supra note 1, at 1680–83 (finding increases in both the prevalence and
duration of unmarried cohabitation between 1995 and 2002).
3. See Gardiner Harris, Out of Wedlock Birth Rates Are Soaring, U.S. Reports, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/health/
13mothers.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (reporting the results of the National Center for
Health Statistics release of the most recent data from the National Vital Statistics System
(NVSS) Natality Data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice); see also Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Nonmarital
Childbearing in the United States, NCHS DATA BRIEF No. 18, National Center for Health
Statistics 2009, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf (reporting the natality
results).
4. See Joanna Reed, Not Crossing the "Extra Line": How Cohabitors with Children
View Their Unions, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1117, 1126 (2006) (discussing how cohabiting
parents believe it is better to be married before having a child); see also Sharon Sassler &
Anna Cunningham, How Cohabitors View Childbearing, 51 SOC. PERSP. 3, 14–16 (2008)
(discussing how a qualitative sample of cohabiting individuals who are not (yet) parents
believe that marriage should precede childbearing).
5. Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, The Living Arrangements of New
Unmarried Mothers, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 415, 420 (2002); see also Kennedy & Bumpass,
supra note 1, at 1676 (reporting that 18% of all births during the 1997 to 2001 period were
to cohabiting mothers and about 34% of all births were non-marital, while approximately
half of births to unmarried women were to cohabiting women).
6. See Steven L. Nock, Marriage as a Public Issue, 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILD. 13,
26–27 (2005) (reporting that a stated goal of the 1996 welfare reform was to encourage the
formation of two-parent families, especially among low-income single mothers); see also
Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2002, H.R. 4700, 107th Cong.
§ 103 (2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107
congbills&docid=f:h4700ih.txt.pdf (stating the importance of promoting family formation
and a healthy marriage); see also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 ("Sec. 101: Findings. The
Congress makes the following findings: 1. Marriage is the foundation of a successful
society. 2. Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society which promotes the
interests of children. 3. Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood is integral to
successful child rearing and the well-being of children."). More recently, the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 provided $150 million per year for programs to promote marriage,
among other objectives, through the Administration for Children and Families’ Healthy
Marriage Initiative; funds may be used for a range of research and demonstration projects,
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much of that attention has focused on the child-bearing and union formation
patterns of the most economically disadvantaged populations. Overlooked
in this emphasis on low-income families is growing evidence that those
with moderate levels of education—individuals who have graduated from
high school or who have pursued some post-secondary schooling but not
obtained a Bachelor’s degree—are also diverging from the middle class in
their family building processes in cohabitation, marriage, childbearing, and
the sequencing of these events.
All of these changes have also accelerated as American women’s
places in the paid labor force have become firmly entrenched.7 Women
account for nearly half of civilian employees.8 In recent decades, the
largest increase in female employment has been among mothers with young
children.9 However, the social class divides that are becoming more
apparent in patterns of union formation and childbearing are also emerging
among working women, and particularly among working mothers. What
these trends suggest is that the confluence of marital behavior and the
returns to employment are fueling the diverging destinies of America’s
families, with important and long-range ramifications for children.10
including marriage education, relationship skills training, mentoring programs, and public
advertising campaigns on the value of marriage. See generally Reauthorization of the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, 71 Fed. Reg. 37,454, 37,455–62 (June
29, 2006) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 261–263, 265).
7. See Catherine Rampell, As Layoffs Surge, Women May Pass Men in Job Force,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/business/
06women.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (describing how the increase in layoffs has
affected men’s employment more than women’s, with the result being an increase in the
proportion of the work force that is female) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
8. See
Employment
Situation
News
Release,
Bureau
of
Labor
Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) ("As of
November [of 2009], women held 49.9% of the nation’s jobs, according to nonfarm payroll
data collected by the. Bureau of Labor Statistics.") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
9. See U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, June 1976–2006, available
at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/fertility/cps2006/SupFertTab5.xls (showing
that, in 1980, only 38% of women aged 15 to 44 who had given birth in the prior year
worked in the paid labor force, which increased to 55.9% among similarly aged women in
2006); see also Gloria P. Glorings, The Employment Situation: December 2007, 55 EMP. &
EARNINGS 1 (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn200801.pdf (showing
that the increase was much smaller for the total population of women in the civilian labor
force, whose participation rates increased only from 51.5% in 1980 to 59.6% as of 2006
according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics); U.S. Census Bureau, 130 MONTHLY
LABOR REV. 6 (Nov. 2007), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/11/mlr200711.pdf.
10. See generally Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring
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Consider the experiences of women lawyers and legal scholars, and the
administrative assistants that people their offices, for example. The
educational requirements for the jobs clearly differ, but so do the
employment opportunities, the work-family policies, the family stressors,
and increasingly, the well being of these groups of women. Further, the
choices these women make regarding work following the births of their
children differ based upon social class, leading us to conclude that highly
educated women are not necessarily "opting out" of the workforce as a
large-scale social trend.11
Here, we illustrate some of these changes and show you how women’s
family building behaviors are diverging across social class groups. We also
present information on the employment patterns of women, by marital and
parental status, drawing on recent data from the American Community
Survey gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau. Finally, we address some
reasons why professional women may be less likely to leave the workforce
than their less-educated peers.
I. Demographic Trends
The lives of American women have changed dramatically since the
middle of the twentieth century. Focusing on various demographic trends,
including marital delay, the rise in non-marital cohabitation, increases in
non-marital births, and rates of marriage, reveal that while such changes
have been broadly experienced, the ramifications—in terms of the
likelihood of experiencing such events, as well as the outcomes associated
with them—vary widely by social class.12 Overall, these trends suggest that
Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607 (2004) (explaining
differential opportunities between college-educated women and their less-educated
counterparts). These differences are further elaborated upon in McLanahan’s subsequent
review article. See generally Sara McLanahan & Christine Percheski, Family Structure and
the Reproduction of Inequalities, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 257 (2008) (suggesting that family
structure has become an important mechanism for the reproduction of class, race, and gender
inequalities). Increases in income inequality exacerbate the growth in single motherhood
among less educated women, which in turn affects children’s material resources and the
parenting they experience. Id. at 271.
11. See Christine Percheski, Opting Out? Cohort Differences in Professional Women’s
Employment Rates from 1960 to 2005, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 497, 507–13 (2008) (demonstrating
that employment levels among college-educated women are very high, even among women
in historically male professions and mothers of young children).
12. See Joshua R. Goldstein & Catherine T. Kenney, Marriage Delayed or Marriage
Forgone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S. Women, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 506,
507–08 (2001) (explaining the recent trends in marriage rates).
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the most highly educated women have an increasing advantage over those
women with some college or less in that they are more likely to marry13
(either following cohabitation or without ever cohabiting),14 giving them
greater access to their partners’ economic resources and the "enforceable
trust" of legally sanctioned unions.15 Women with a college degree or more
are also substantially less likely to have children out of wedlock.16 Finally,
they are also better able to negotiate shared household responsibilities with
their partners17 or outsource these duties,18 reducing their "second shift."19
13. See id. at 510–19 (describing how, in contrast to the not so distant past, recent
college graduates are now forecast to marry at higher levels than their less-educated
counterparts, despite their later entry into first marriage). The authors argue that this
educational crossover, evidence of which is found for both black women and white women
in recent cohorts, suggests that marriage is increasingly becoming a province of the most
educated, and suggest that this trend may become a new source of inequality for future
generations. Id. at 516.
14. See Daniel T. Lichter, Zhenchao Qian & Leanna M. Mellott, Marriage or
Dissolution? Union Transitions Among Poor Cohabiting Women, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 223, 232
(2006) (showing that among nonpoor women, cohabitation is more likely to transition to
marriage than it is among poor women); see also Daniel T. Lichter & Zhenchao Qian, Serial
Cohabitation and the Marital Life Course, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 861, 867–72 (2008)
(depicting the lower rates of single-instance and serial cohabitation prior to marriage among
women with more education and advantaged family upbringings); Kristi Williams, Sharon
Sassler & Lisa M. Nicholson, For Better or for Worse? The Consequences of Marriage and
Cohabitation for Single Mothers, 86 SOC. FORCES 1481, 1490, 1498 (2008) (showing that
single mothers are less likely to marry than childless women and if they do, less likely to
experience enduring marriages and to benefit in terms of improved physical health from
their unions).
15. See Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 15
FUTURE OF CHILD. 33, 37–39 (2005) (arguing that children, especially poor and minority
children, are increasingly likely to grow up in single-parent families and to experience
family instability).
16. See David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single Parent
Families: What Do We Know? Where Do We Look for Answers?, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 3,
28–29 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004) (documenting the rise in non-marital childbearing
among women in the bottom and middle third of the educational distribution, while the
proportion of women in the top third of the educational distribution—college-educated
women—experiencing births outside of marriage has remained relatively flat over the past
few decades).
17. See Suzanne Bianchi, Melissa Milkie, Liana Sayer & John Robinson, Is Anyone
Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor, 79 SOC. FORCES
191, 216–19 (2000) (showing that when wives have more education than their husbands,
women do less housework and men do more housework than couples where wives have less
education than their husbands; also demonstrating that the greater the wives’ relative
incomes, the less housework they do and the more housework their husbands do).
18. See Judith Treas & Esther de Ruijter, Earnings and Expenditures on Household
Services in Married and Cohabiting Unions, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 196, 801–02 (2008)
(showing that women’s earned income is more important than men’s for reducing their
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One change experienced across social classes is a rise in the age at first
marriage.20 The median age at first marriage increased dramatically
between 1950 and 2006.21 In 1950, half of all women were married for the
first time by age 20.3, and for men by age 22.8.22 By 2006, the median age
at first marriage had risen by over five years for women, to 25.5.23 And the
median age at first marriage for men is also at its highest level ever (27.5).24
While young adults are marrying later, they are not foregoing romantic
relationships. In fact, while there have been delays in the age at first sexual
debut over the past decade,25 the modal age of first sex nowadays is
between age 16 and 17, leaving contemporary young adults quite a lengthy
period of time to explore intimate relationships.26
Perhaps because premarital sexual relationships have become
normative,27 other aspects of union formation behavior have changed as
domestic burden by outsourcing to purchase female tasks, and that the earnings of married
men are more strongly linked to expenditures on female tasks than are the earnings of
cohabiting men); see also Sanjiv Gupta, Her Money, Her Time: Women’s Earnings and
Their Housework Hours, 35 SOC. SCI. RES. 975, 987–88 (2006) (showing that the difference
between the mean housework hours of the women with the lowest and highest earnings is as
large as the difference between the mean housework hours of women and men).
19. See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND
THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (explaining the term "second shift," which is when
women work outside of the home in the paid labor force and are also responsible for
domestic labor in the home, generally to a much greater extent than their male partners).
20. See U.S. Census Bureau, Estimated Median Age at First Marriage, by Sex: 1890
to the Present, CURRENT POP. SURVEY, http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hhfam/ms2.pdf (Sept. 2006) (depicting the median age at first marriage, by sex, from 1890 to
the present).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See generally Joyce C. Abma, Gladys M. Martinez, William D. Mosher & Brittany
S. Dawson, Teenagers in the United States: Sexual Activity, Contraceptive Use, and
Childbearing, 2002, 23 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. (2004) (stating the findings of an analysis
comparing results from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth with the previous
survey conducted in 1995, which found that sexual activity declined significantly for
younger teenage girls and for teenage boys).
26. See Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954–2003,
122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 73, 76 (2007) (using data from four cycles of the National Survey of
Family Growth (1982–2002) to show that almost all Americans have sex before marrying).
For example, among cohorts of women turning 15 between 1964 and 1993, at least 91% had
had premarital sex by age 30, as had 82% of those turning 15 between 1954 and 1963. Id. at
77.
27. Id. at 78.
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well. In particular, over the past few decades there has been a dramatic
increase in cohabiting unions, or couples who are living together without
being married. Between 1990 and 2000 the increase in heterosexual,
cohabiting couple households captured in the Census rose by 71%.28 The
likelihood that American adults will live with an opposite-sex romantic
partner without being married has increased across all age groups, marital
statuses, and educational levels.29 Among recent cohorts of American
women, more than half of those in their 20s and 30s have lived with (at
least one) opposite-sex partner without being married.30 But cohabitation
has also changed over the past few years, as it has become increasingly
common.31
For one thing, as cohabitation has become more normative, the
likelihood that cohabitors will go on to marry has declined.32 Another
important shift is that as cohabitation has become more acceptable, it is
increasingly the union choice not just of the most disadvantaged, but of
more educated women as well.33 In 1987, for example, the proportions of
women with high school degrees, some college, or a college degree who
had ever cohabited by age 45 were about the same, ranging between 30 and
32%; by 1995 there had been a large increase in cohabitation among
women with high school degrees, and over the next few years the
proportion of women with some college education or a Bachelor’s degree
28. PCT14. Unmarried-Partner Households by Sex of Partners, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-ds_
name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-_lang=en&-mt_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_PCT014&-format=CONTEXT=dt (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice). See generally Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, How Many
Unmarried Couples Are There in Your Neighborhood?, http://www.unmarriedtoeachother.
com/census/ (detailing how to determine number of unmarried couples in a given
neighborhood) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
29. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 2, at 31–32 (explaining the trends in cohabitation);
see also Kennedy & Bumpass, supra note 1, at 1680–83 (reviewing changes in estimates of
cohabitation utilizing the 1995 and 2002 waves of the National Survey of Family Growth, or
NSFG).
30. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 2, at 32 ("By 1995, half of the women in their
thirties had cohabited outside of marriage.").
31. See id. (explaining that this is important in showing how the increased tolerance of
cohabitation is likely to continue in the whole population).
32. See id. at 33 (stating this produces decreased stability of unions); see also Lichter,
Qian & Mellott, supra note 14, at 236 (showing results that indicate a declining share of
cohabitors transitioning to marriage than earlier studies reported).
33. See generally Bumpass & Lu, supra note 2 (comparing results based on the
women’s level of education).
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who had ever cohabited jumped.34 While cohabitation has become
normative across all educational groups, the increase has been the most
dramatic for those with high school degrees or some college education.
Between 1987 and 2002, the shares of women with a high school degree
who had ever cohabited increased 115% while for women with some
college the proportions grew 93%. The increase for women with a college
degree, while substantial, was far smaller in comparison—only 45%.35
One of the more dramatic changes reshaping American families has
been the significant increase in births to women who are unmarried. While
teen pregnancy has garnered a lot of attention,36 in large part because
nowadays teenagers rarely get married if they decide to give birth to a
child,37 between 1990 and 2006 teen birth rates actually declined.38 The age

34. Id. See generally Anjani Chandram, G.M. Martinez, William D. Mosher, Joyce C.
Abma & J. Jones, Fertility, Family Planning, and Reproductive Health of U.S.
Women: Data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, 25 VITAL & HEALTH STAT.
1 (CDC, Vital & Health Stat. Series No. 23, 2005) [hereinafter 2002 National Survey].
35. These estimates are calculated from Bumpass & Lu, supra note 2, and 2002
National Survey, supra note 34.
36. See Sara Rimer, TV’s Perfect Girl Is Pregnant; Real Families Talk, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2007, at A1 (demonstrating that since 2006 there has also been the widely
publicized pregnancy of the sister of Brittany Spears, movies about teen pregnancy (Juno),
and media coverage of rumors of teen pregnancy "pacts"); see also Katherine Q. Seelye,
Palin’s Teen Daughter Is Pregnant; New G.O.P. Tumult, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2008
(discussing pregnancy of the daughter of the 2008 Republican vice-presidential candidate).
Furthermore, rates of teen pregnancy, which had been in decline since the early 1990s,
began to rise again in the latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, with data
from the CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) reporting that the U.S. teen
birth rate increased in 2007 for the second straight year. Press Release, CDC, Teen Birth
Rates Up Again in 2007 (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/pressroom/09newsreleases/teenbirth2007.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). The full text of the report can be found in Brady
E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin & Stephanie Ventura, Births: Preliminary Data for 2007 No.
12, 57 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1 (2009), http://www. cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57
/nvsr57_12.pdf.
37. See Press Release, Nat’l Campaign to Prevent Teen & Unplanned Pregnancy, Bill
Albert, Teens, Relationships, and Marriage: A Statement from the National Campaign to
Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.thenational
campaign.org/media/press-release.aspx?releaseID=26 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) ("Despite
high expectations for marriage, fewer than 8% of teen mothers marry their baby’s father
within one year of the birth of their child.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
38. See Nat’l Campaign to Prevent Teen & Unplanned Pregnancy, Teen Birthrates in
1940–2006
(2009),
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org
the
United
States,
/resources/pdf/TBR_1940-2006.pdf (demonstrating that between 1991 and 2005, the teen
birth rate decreased 35% to a record low of 40.5 of every 1,000 teen girls in 2005).
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group that has experienced the largest increase in non-marital births is
women ages 20 to 24.39
At the same time that there have been shifts in the age at which women
experience non-marital childbearing, the context in which many of these
children are born has also changed. Family building increasingly occurs
within cohabiting unions, and adults entering into new cohabiting unions
often bring children from prior relationships with them. Nearly half of nonmarital births, for example, are to cohabiting women.40 And sizable
proportions of children are projected to live with a parent and his or her
cohabiting partner at some point while growing up.41
II. The Changing Class Dimension of Parenting Experiences
The outcomes of unplanned pregnancy have also shifted in recent
decades. "Shot-Gun Weddings," or marriages that follow a conception, are
less likely to take place in the closing decades of the 20th century than they
were in the 1950s through the 1970s—particularly among certain
populations.42 The end result of these changes is that the likelihood of
39. See Nat’l Campaign to Prevent Teen & Unplanned Pregnancy,
Briefly . . . Unplanned Pregnancy & Community Colleges (2007), http://www.thenational
campaign.org/resources/pdf/briefly-unplanned-pregnancy-and-community-colleges.pdf
(stating that "[m]ore than one-third of all unplanned pregnancies . . . are to unmarried
women in their twenties"). In response to the decline in teen pregnancy, and the continued
high rates of unintended pregnancy, in conjunction with the increased compositional shift of
unintended births to women in their early twenties, the National Campaign to Prevent Teen
Pregnancy expanded their name to include "and Unplanned," and now includes an emphasis
on women in their early twenties. See generally NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN &
UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, www.thenationalcampaign.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
40. Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 5, at 420; accord Kennedy & Bumpass,
supra note 1, at 1676 (charting statistics cited).
41. See generally Patrick Heuveline & Jeffrey M. Timberlake, The Role of
Cohabitation in Family Formation: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1214, 1214–30 (2004) (discussing children living with cohabitating
parent and partner); see also Deborah Koempke Graefe & Daniel T. Lichter, Life Course
Transitions of American Children: Parental Cohabitation, Marriage, and Single
Motherhood, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 205, 210 (1999) (noting likelihood of children living in
cohabitating unions). These sources estimate that between one-quarter to one-third of
children will live in a cohabiting union prior to age 16, whether due to being born into a
cohabiting union, having biological parents form a cohabiting union following their birth, or
because their (custodial) parent enters into a cohabiting union with a non-biological parent
after the birth.
42. See R. Kelly Raley, Increasing Fertility in Cohabiting Unions: Evidence for the
Second Demographic Transition in the United States?, 38 DEMOGRAPHY 59, 63 (2001)
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giving birth outside of marriage, while quite high for the least advantaged
women, has risen dramatically for those women in the middle of the social
class spectrum.43 These are the women who some have begun to term "the
missing middle"44 or the "moderately educated";45 they generally have a
high school degree, some college education, or an Associate’s degree—but
not a Bachelor’s degree. Of women who gave birth in 2006, for example,
approximately two-thirds (67.4%) of those who had less than a high school
level of education were unmarried, whereas 91.7% of new mothers with 16
or more years of schooling (a Bachelor’s degree or higher) were married.
Women with at least 12 years of schooling or some post-secondary
attendance were intermediate between these two extremes. Slightly more
than half of new mothers who had only a high school diploma but no
further education (51.3%) were unmarried; for women with some postsecondary education, the proportion was smaller, though still not
insignificant, as over one-third (34%) of new mothers in this group were
unmarried.46 These estimates, however, likely understate patterns on non("From the early 1970s to the early 1990s, women single at conception became much less
likely to marry before the birth of their child. Instead, they increasingly remained single or
began cohabiting."); see generally Kelly Musick, Planned and Unplanned Childbearing
Among Unmarried Women, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 915, 915–29 (2002) (discussing
cohabitation trends). Several recent qualitative studies have begun to explore the
justifications given for not marrying following the birth of a child. See Sharon Sassler,
Amanda Miller & Sarah M. Favinger, Planned Parenthood? Fertility Intentions and
Experiences, 30 J. FAM. ISSUES 223, 223–25 (exploring the viewpoints of working class
cohabiting parents who believe they should not marry just because they have children
together); see also Joanna M. Reed, Not Crossing the "Extra Line": How Cohabitors with
Children View Their Unions, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1117, 1124 (2006) (expressing the
views of low-income cohabiting parents who say that, "having a child together is not a good
reason to get married").
43. See generally Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 16, at 3–77 (showing changes in the
propensity to experience births outside of marriage by educational attainment). The largest
gain was experienced by women who had not completed their high school diploma, but a
sizable increase was also experienced among women in the middle-third of the educational
distribution (those with a high school diploma or some post-secondary schooling). Id. As of
2000, a quarter of women with between thirteen and fifteen years of school were unmarried
mothers, a 71% increase from 1960. Id.
44. See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING MIDDLE: WORKING FAMILIES AND
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY (2000) (explaining "the missing middle"), and
KATHERINE S. NEWMAN & VICTOR TAN CHEN, THE MISSING CLASS: PORTRAITS OF THE NEAR
POOR IN AMERICA (2007) (same).
45. See generally ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE GO ROUND: THE STATE OF
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY (2009) (describing marriage and
cohabitation trends).
46. Calculated from CDC, VitalStats, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/vitalstats.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
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marital conception, as women who are not married upon discovering they
are pregnant may marry before the birth of the child, or subsequently.
Nonetheless, women who "legitimize" a birth and wed the father of their
new baby—either before or after the birth—are disproportionately drawn
from the more-educated women.47 The end result is that highly educated
women who give birth are more likely to do so in marital unions; their lesseducated counterparts, in contrast, are increasingly parenting within
cohabiting unions, or outside of coresidential relationships. But while
births within cohabiting unions have become more common, such
relationships are far less stable than are marital unions. As a result, the rise
in single parenting among women in the middle education tier has
continued apace between 1980 to the present.48
A discussion of the growing divides in the experiences of more or lesseducated women is incomplete without mentioning one of the key factors
accounting for these changes—marriage. Historically, highly educated
women were less likely to marry than their less-educated counterparts.49
Either they did not want to marry and their better opportunities or work
orientation kept them from marrying or they were not perceived as the best
marriage material. But that has changed in recent decades. Women with
Bachelor’s degrees or more are now more likely to be married than are
women who stop their schooling with a high school diploma—even though
women with college degrees remain better able to support themselves on
their own if they work.50 Furthermore, while divorce rates remain quite
high, they have declined the most sharply among the best-educated

Social Justice).
47. See Raley, supra note 42, at 63 (finding that college-educated women were more
likely to wed following a conception than their less-educated counterparts); see also Musick,
supra note 42, at 920 (defining "planned" births).
48. See McLanahan, supra note 10, at 612–13 (showing that from 1980 to 2000 single
motherhood had risen from approximately 19% to approximately 28% among those in the
middle-education tier).
49. See Goldstein & Kenney, supra note 12, at 516 (demonstrating how 94.5% of noncollege-educated and 91.1% of college-educated women born from 1945–49 ever married
but 86.4% of non-college-educated and 94.6% of college-educated women born from 1960–
64 ever married).
50. See id. at 516 (demonstrating that less-educated women are less likely to marry);
see also Sharon Sassler & Robert Schoen, The Effect of Attitudes and Economic Activity on
Marriage, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 147, 154 (1999) (showing that older women with a strong
career orientation were substantially more likely to marry than the youngest women with
similar work orientations, and that educational attainment and employment improved
women’s odds of marrying relative to less economically attractive women).
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women.51 For example, using data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation to examine marital dissolution rates for U.S. women by
education level, Martin found that divorce rates fell among women with a
four-year college degree or more, but remained high among women with
less than a four-year college degree.52 Among those married for the first
time between 1990 and 1994, for example, women in the middle education
tier were nearly twice as likely to have divorced within a ten-year period as
their female counterparts who were in the top third of the education
distribution.53 The result is that highly educated women are now more
likely to get married and stay married than women with lower levels of
education. They are also more likely to parent within marital unions, which
are more stable than cohabiting relationships.54
III. The Employment Experiences of Mothers: The "Opt
Out" Debate, Revisited
The employment patterns of highly educated women following
childbearing are also contributing to the growing divide between more and
less-educated women and their families. Recent high profile newspaper
stories suggest that professional women are increasingly choosing to leave
the paid labor force in order to care for young children,55 feeling that
51. See Matthew D. Bramlett & William O. Mosher, Cohabitation, Marriage,
Divorce, and Remarriage in the U.S. Ser. No. 23, 22 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 19, 55 (2002)
(showing that less-educated women are more likely to divorce than more-educated women 1,
3, 5, 10, and 15 years after first marriage).
52. See Steven P. Martin, Trends in Marital Dissolution by Women’s Education in the
United States, 15 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 537, 546 (2006) (demonstrating that whereas women
in the bottom third of the educational distribution experienced a 4.3% increase in the
likelihood of experiencing the dissolution of first marriage within a ten-year period between
those marrying in 1975–79 and those who wed between 1990–94, women in the top third of
the education distribution experienced a 12.8% decline in the likelihood of divorcing within
ten years).
53. Id. at tbl.1.
54. See Bramlett & Mosher, supra note 51, at 7–8 (showing that women who live with
a partner have a greater likelihood of experiencing the dissolution of that union within ten
years than do women who marry their partner); see also McLanahan, supra note 10, at 612–
13 (showing that even when children are involved, cohabiting couples are far less likely to
remain together over a five-year period than are married parents).
55. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42
(identifying a situation in which women from elite colleges, with impressive occupational
credentials, "chose" to pursue motherhood over high-flying careers); see also Louise Story,
Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career Path to Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005,
at A1 (interviewing a small handful of women at colleges such as Harvard and Yale
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maternal employment and mothering are not compatible, and that children
thereby suffer. In focusing on professional women, such stories utilize the
language of "choice," to convey the notion that leaving the paid labor force
is an option that professional women, who have more options than their
less-advantaged counterparts, can avail themselves of.56
But are
professional women more likely to be leaving the paid labor force than their
less occupationally privileged counterparts?
The proportion of women, particularly mothers, who were employed
in the paid labor force increased steadily from the mid-1970s.57 However,
the number of employed mothers as a share of all adult women
subsequently declined, dropping to 55% in 2000 and remaining at that level
in 2002 and 2004. Many in the popular press heralded this unprecedented
(if small) decline in maternal employment as a rejection of the world of
work and as a harbinger of future change. Women were voting with their
feet, such stories suggested, leaving paid employment because they viewed
it as detrimental to their children, to their ability to be good mothers, and to
their marriages. Stories in the popular press focused in particular on
professional women, such as prominent political consultants leaving for
"family reasons,"58 or women in high paid careers who "opt out" to be stayat-home soccer moms.59
University and concluding that college women expressed a desire to assume the primary
responsibility of caring for the home and children once they began childbearing). In the
words of one young woman, "My mother’s always told me you can’t be the best career
woman and the best mother at the same time. You always have to choose one over the
other." Id.
56. See generally PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY WOMEN REALLY QUIT CAREERS
AND HEAD HOME (2007) (arguing that structural constraints—inflexible work places, the
long hours required for professional jobs, as well as being married to professional husbands
with similar time and occupational demands—rather than "choice" shaped women’s
decisions to leave the paid labor force for the job of raising children).
57. See generally Philip N. Cohen & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Marriage, Children, and
Women’s Employment: What Do We Know?, 122 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1999, at 22–31
(reviewing changes in the likelihood that mothers would work in the paid labor force); see
also Jane Lawler Dye, Fertility of American Women: June 2004, P20-555 CURRENT POP.
REP. 7, fig.2 (Dec. 2005) (documenting that between 1976 and 1998, the percentage of
employed mothers grew from 31% to 59%).
58. See Robin Toner, The Nation: Women’s Place; at the Table, but not for Dinner,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at 43, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/28/
weekinreview/the-nation-women-s-place-at-the-table-but-not-for-dinner.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2010) (discussing Karen Hughes’ decision to return to Texas for family reasons)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
59. See generally Joan C. Williams, Jessica Manvell & Stephanie Bornstein, "Opt
Out" or Pushed Out? How the Press Covers Work/Family Conflict, The Untold Story of
Why Women Leave the Workforce, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE L. (2006),
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Such stories largely ignored the bigger picture, and failed to examine
the employment patterns of professional women relative to their lesseducated counterparts. In fact, recent cohorts of professional women are
even more likely to work full-time, year-round than their counterparts who
were born during World War II (1936 to 1945) or the Early Baby Boom
cohort (born 1946 to 1955).60 Furthermore, compared to the total
population of U.S. women, professional women work at considerably
higher rates.61 Employment among women with young children also has
increased dramatically over time; approximately 76% of women born
between 1956 and 1975 with children under the age of six were employed.62
The hullaballoo about opting out notwithstanding, Generation X
professional women with young children were more likely to work fulltime, year-round than any previous cohort.63
Highly educated women are more likely to be employed during
pregnancies, as well as within the first year of their children’s births, than
are less-educated women. Among women who had their first birth between
2001 and 2003, for example, less than a third of women who had not
obtained a high school degree were employed during their pregnancies, as
were 59.1% of high school graduates, compared with three-quarters of
those with some college and 82.2% of those with at least a college degree.64
Higher levels of education are also accompanied by higher utilization of
paid-leave benefits following the birth of a child.65
http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf (reviewing how media coverage of
work-family challenges emphasizes the "choice" of leaving rather than structural
impediments to staying in the paid labor force).
60. See Percheski, supra note 11 (showing that employment levels among collegeeducated women in professional and managerial occupations have increased across birth
cohorts, and continue to rise, even among women in historically male professions and
mothers of young children).
61. See Liana C. Sayer, Philip N. Cohen & Lynne M. Casper, Women, Men, and Work,
in THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: CENSUS 2000, 76, 97–98 (Reynods Farley & John Haaga eds.,
2005) (showing that 55% of professional women aged 25 to 34 who were born between
1966 and 1975 worked full-time, year-round, compared with 44% for women in the general
population).
62. Percheski, supra note 11, at 509.
63. Id. at 513.
64. Tallese D. Johnson, Maternity Leave and Employment Patterns of First Time
Mothers: 1961–2003, P70-113 CURRENT POP. REP. 5, tbl.2 (2007).
65. Id. at 9, tbl.5 (showing that the proportions of women with a high school degree
who utilized paid leave was much smaller (39.1%) than for women with a Bachelor’s degree
or more (60% of whom used paid leave)). The least educated women were more likely to
quit their jobs (37.2% of women with less than a high school degree utilized this approach,
compared to 18.8% of women with a college degree or more). Id. at 11, tbl.7.
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While prevalence rates of female employment by educational
attainment and maternal status can highlight persistence or reduction in the
paid labor force, these figures cannot definitively provide an answer to the
question of whether women are opting out of challenging professional
demands by moving to less "greedy" jobs,66 or if they depart the paid labor
force once they have children. Even examining maternal employment
within the year following the birth of a child cannot fully answer this
question because women may leave the labor force as children age and it
becomes more challenging to engage in the intensive mothering expected in
today’s society, or they may depart after the birth of a second child.67 Such
arguments notwithstanding, it is clear that highly educated new mothers are
managing to juggle work and family considerably more often than are lesseducated women. In other words, women who are lawyers and academics
are far more likely to return to work following the birth of their children
than are the women who are their administrative assistants.
Once these more highly educated women are married with children, an
additional support may exist to help facilitate their remaining in the
workplace. Many married women are faced with an unequal division of
household labor because they find themselves working a larger "second
shift" than their husbands once they return home from their paid jobs.68
That is, although women’s roles in the workforce have changed
dramatically, men have not yet taken on a corresponding share of the
division of labor at home.69 Still, middle class women generally do a
smaller share of the housework and/or outsource the household labor to
lower class women70 when at least one member of the couple has a
66. See generally MARY BLAIR-LOY, COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND FAMILY
AMONG WOMEN EXECUTIVES (2003).
67. See generally STONE, supra note 56 (arguing that it is often the second child that
causes women to leave the paid labor force). The costs of paying for multiple day cares
becomes prohibitive, and older children are seen as having needs that are less able to be met
by the low-wage (and often less-educated) women who are child care workers. Id.
68. See Scott South & Glenna Spitze, Housework in Marital and Nonmarital
Households, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 327, 327 (1994) ("In all situations [single hood, cohabitation,
married, divorced, and widowed], women spend more time than men doing housework but
the gender gap is widest among married persons.").
69. See Liana Sayer et al., Women, Men, and Work, in THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE: CENSUS 2000, 77 (Reynolds Farley & John Haaga, eds. 2004) ("For several
decades, conflicts between work and family were defined as women’s issues because, since
1950, women’s work and family roles have changed more dramatically than men’s.").
70. See generally Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Domestica: Immigrant Workers
Cleaning and Caring in the Shadows of Affluence (2001) (exploring the lives of modern day
domestic servants from immigrant backgrounds), and Esther de Ruijter et al., Outsourcing
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relatively high level of income or education.71 However, some evidence
suggests that it is the relative resources of the female partner that matter.72
Working class men may also be more reluctant than middle class men to
take on a greater share of the household labor due, in part, to their more
gender-traditional attitudes.73 The greater help with the housework that
middle class women receive from their husbands (or purchase from
cleaning services), then, may make it easier for women with more
education to remain in the paid labor force following the birth of a child.
The structure of specific occupations may also help more educated
women remain in the workforce to a greater extent than their less-educated
counterparts. Although married men have increased the proportion of
childcare they do over the past few decades,74 parenting responsibilities still
fall disproportionately on the female partner,75 making it difficult to balance
work and childcare.
Although some very high-level professional
occupations lack flexibility, many allow for part-time or flexible work
hours. For example, some female lawyers are able to work at firms with
fewer billable hours or at firms that offer the opportunity to remain on
the Gender Factory: Living Arrangements and Service Expenditures on Female and Male
Tasks, 84 SOC. FORCES 315 (2005) (showing that married couple households spend more on
female-typed tasks when women are more educated).
71. See Beth Anne Shelton & Daphne John, Does Marital Status Make a Difference?
Housework Among Married and Cohabiting Men and Women, 14 J. FAMILY ISSUES 401,
412–13 (1993) (demonstrating that women do less housework when they or their partners
have higher levels of income and/or education).
72. See Shannon Davis & Theodore Greenstein, Cross-National Variations in the
Division of Household Labor, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1260, 1260 (2004) ("[I]n households
where wives’ educations equals or exceeds that of their husbands, husbands are more likely
to perform half of the household labor.").
73. See generally FRANCINE DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: HOW EQUALLY SHARED
PARENTING WORKS (1999) (examining the familial structure of families with two income
earners and children); LILLIAN RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN: LIFE IN THE WORKING CLASS
FAMILY (1976) (discussing the distinct struggles of the white working class compared to the
middle class); LILLIAN RUBIN, FAMILIES ON THE FAULT LINE: AMERICA’S WORKING CLASS
SPEAKS ABOUT THE FAMILY, THE ECONOMY, RACE, AND ETHNICITY (1994) (combating the
myth that America is a classless society).
74. See Suzanne Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic
Change or Surprising Continuity?, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401, 410–11 (2000) (showing that
college-educated married fathers have increased the amount of time they spend caring for
children at a significantly greater rate than their less-educated male counterparts).
75. See Liana Sayer et al., Are Parents Investing Less in Children? Trends in Mothers’
and Fathers’ Time with Children, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1, 19–24 (2004) (concluding that mothers
spent at least as much time with their children in 1998 as in 1965, if not more, and that
married fathers still do less childcare than married mothers, but the gap has narrowed over
the past few decades).
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partnership track while working reduced hour schedules.76 Academics have
greater flexibility regarding their responsibilities (such as when they will
teach courses, conduct research, or write) than do less advantaged women
with more rigid time schedules and who report to others. The same
opportunities often do not exist for less-educated women employed in
administrative assistant or service industry roles.77 Even if working class
women are able to find part-time or flexible employment, it often does not
pay enough to cover the costs of daycare and transportation, nor do their
male partners earn enough to be able to make up for these costs.78
IV. Conclusions
Overall, the future looks very different for middle-class and
working-class women. It promises far more stability for collegeeducated women than it does for the less educated ones. More-educated
women are more likely to marry than their less-advantaged counterparts,
and for the growing share that have lived with a partner prior to the
wedding, their likelihood of avoiding pregnancy until after the knot has
been tied is greater.79 Much of that, of course, is a function of their
higher social class standing to start with. But they and their partners’
behaviors following marriage demonstrate how such advantages can
then contribute to their further accumulation of social capital that would

76. Project for Attorney Retention, Interim Report, WORKLIFE L. (2001), available at
http://www.pardc.org/Publications/lf_interim_report.shtml (describing the need for such
programs and the widespread difficulties concerning their implementation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also Patrick Schiltz, On
Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical
Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 924–40 (1999) (suggesting that young lawyers who
desire a better work-family balance avoid large law firms in favor of alternative practice
settings).
77. See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY
IN AMERICA (2002) (discussing the difficulties of living on minimum wage).
78. See generally JERRY JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK,
FAMILY, AND GENDER INEQUALITY (2004) (exploring how time demands in the workplace
put women at a disadvantage when trying to consecutively fulfill the traditional caretaker
role); JEAN POTUCHEK, WHO SUPPORTS THE FAMILY? GENDER AND BREADWINNING IN DUALEARNER MARRIAGES (1997) (examining how more men in dual-income families expect their
wives to work regardless of income).
79. See McLanahan, supra note 10, at 612–13 (showing that in 2000, approximately
28% of those women in the middle-education tier were single mothers compared to
approximately 7% for the most educated women).
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firmly ensconce them in the middle class, and enable them to provide
more for their children.
The work and family balancing act of professional women, such as
lawyers and academics, is often substantively different from what less
educated women—such as the administrative assistants who people our
offices—have to look forward to. While juggling demanding jobs and
family needs is not easy for professional women, such women are most
likely to benefit from institutional supports such as marriage, the
financial benefits provided by spouses, and what are often well-paid
careers, in addition to having greater access to supportive work-place
employment policies.
The prospects for less-educated women, in contrast, look far
bleaker. They are less likely nowadays to get married80 or stay
married.81 More of the women in the middle-education tier are having
children outside of marriage.82 These unions are less stable than marriages,
and if they break up, the likelihood of marrying a subsequent partner is
reduced.83 Unstable unions are problematic for children as well.84 And the
employment prospects for less-educated women are not that rosy. Finding
a job can be challenging, but there are time limits placed on the duration
single mothers or those in need of aid can receive public assistance.85 When
less educated women are employed, it is often in low wage positions, which
80. See Goldstein & Kenney, supra note 12 at 516 (demonstrating how 94.5% of noncollege-educated and 91.1% of college-educated women born from 1945–1949 ever married
but 86.4% of non-college-educated and 94.6% of college-educated women born from 1960–
1964 ever married).
81. See Bramlett & Mosher, supra note 51, at 55 (showing that less-educated women
are more likely to divorce than more-educated women at all intervals up to 15 years after
first marriage).
82. See McLanahan, supra note 10, at 612–13 (showing that in 2000 over one-quarter
(28%) of women with a high school degree or some college schooling were single mothers,
compared with only 7% of women who had a college or advanced degree).
83. See Lichter, Qian & Mellott, supra note 14, at 232–35 (showing that poor women
with more children are more likely to dissolve their cohabiting unions than those with less
children, or those who are not poor); see also Graefe & Lichter, supra note 41, at 291
(showing that having a child out of wedlock is more likely to lead to divorce, even if the
woman marries her child’s biological father).
84. See McLanahan, supra note 10, at 610 (discussing how children of single mothers
have a more stressful upbringing due to the lack of financial and emotional support from
their fathers).
85. See Health and Human Services, Fact Sheet: Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (1996), http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/abbrev/
prwora96.htm ("Families who have received assistance for five cumulative years (or less at
state option) will be ineligible for cash aid under the new welfare law.").
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actually increase their expenses.86 Even with relatively low earnings, they
often do not qualify for subsidized childcare and must piece together family
members or friends who are willing to watch their children on occasion, or
pay large proportions of their income to procure care for their children.87
Their jobs are often physically difficult, but they find themselves uninsured
or underinsured.88 In short, less-educated women are disadvantaged both at
home and at work, which makes striking a balance between the two
extremely difficult. Focusing more attention on reducing the challenges of
balancing work and family faced by women who are neither the most
disadvantaged nor the most advantaged is crucial if we are to stem the
widening of social disparities.

86. See generally KATHERINE EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE
MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW WAGE WORK (1997) (finding that unskilled,
unemployed, single mothers may be worse off working than on welfare), and Newman &
Chen, supra note 44 (exploring the lives of families between the middle and working
classes).
87. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 86 and accompanying text; NEWMAN & CHEN, supra note
44 and accompanying text; see generally Sharon Hays, Flat Broke with Children: Women in
the Age of Welfare Reform (2003) (exploring the impact of welfare reform on America’s
poor).
88. See NEWMAN & CHEN, supra note 44, at 119–48 (describing the poor health
conditions of low-wage workers, most of whom are uninsured or underinsured).

